

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 001469 TOSEC 250190

41

ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

66011

DRAFTED BY:S/S-O:PKJOHNSON

APPROVED BY:S/S-O:PKJOHNSON

----- 102692

P 041319Z JAN 76 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 001469 TOSEC 250190

NODIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT DAKAR 0027 ACTION SECSTATE 03 JAN 76

QUOTE

S E C R E T DAKAR 0027

NODIS

DEPT PASS SECRETARY

FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFEELE

DEPT PLEASE REPEAT TO: ABIDJAN, LIBREVILLE, KINSHASA, YAOUNDE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, AO, SG, US

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SECK ON ANGOLA

1. IN JAN. 3 MEETING WITH SENEGALESE FORNMIN SECK, IMMEDIATELY  
AFTER MEETING WITH SENGHOR, ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFEELE TRACED  
HISTORY OF USSR INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA, POINTING OUT CUBAN ROLE  
AND DESCRIBING US EFFORTS TO HELP MAINTAIN SITUATION ON GROUND  
LEADING TO NEGOTIATIONS. HE NOTED THAT SOUTH AFRICA HAD COME INTO  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 001469 TOSEC 250190

PICTURE IN REACTION TO WHAT IT PERCEIVED AS SOVIET/CUBAN MEANCE.

NO CONSULTATION WITH US HAD BEEN ENTERED INTO BY SOUTH AFRICANS BEFORE MAKING STEP. IT WAS WORTH NOTING THAT SOUTH AFRICA APPARENTLY COULD LIVE WITH REGIME IN MOZAMBIQUE BUT FELT OBLIGED TO TAKE STEPS WHEN CONFRONTED WITH SOVIET THRUST. SCHAUFLELE SAID DOMESTIC DEBATE SHOWED THAT SOUTH AFRICANS, HOWEVER, WERE CLEARLY NOT COMFORTABLE WITH ANGOLAN INVOLVEMENT. US WAS READY TO USE ITS INFLUENCE TO PERSUADE SOUTH AFRICA TO WITHDRAW FROM ANGOLA IN CONTEXT OF WITHDRAWAL OF ALL OUTSIDE FORCES, AND WE BELIEVED WE COULD BE SUCCESSFUL IF OTHER FORCES WERE REMOVED.

2. SCHAUFLELE STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF ADDIS MEETING FROM US POINT OF VIEW, AND UNDERLINED US SUPPORT FOR AFRICAN SOLUTION. IF GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY WERE ESTABLISHED, US WOULD BE WILLING TO HELP, ALONG WITH OTHERS, TO MEET IMMEDIATE RELIEF NEEDS IN ANGOLA. SEVERAL IDEAS FOR OAU ACTION HAVE BEEN SUGGESTED, SCHAUFLELE SAID, ELEMENTS OF WHICH INCLUDED: (1) CEASEFIRE; (2) CESSATION OF ARMS SHIPMENTS AND REINFORCEMENT OF MILITARY AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL; (3) OAU MEDIATION TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS; AND (4) WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN INTERFERENCE. SCHAUFLELE SAID ZAMBIA HAD PLAN WHICH WAS BEING DISCUSSED RATHER WIDELY, BUT THERE WERE OTHER PROPOSALS AS WELL. US DESIRED THAT THREE PARTIES IN ANGOLA FORM GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. WHAT HAPPENED AFTER THAT--IF IT DEVELOPED IN ANGOLAN FRAMEWORK--WOULD NOT CONCERN US AS LONG AS IT NOT BASED ON FOREIGN INTERVENTION. WHILE HE HAD VISITED FIVE AFRICAN CHIEFS OF STATE WHO HAD SPOKEN OUT FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO ANGOLAN SITUATION, SCHAUFLELE SAID US WAS ALSO IN CONTACT WITH OTHER AFRICAN LEADERS. ZAMBIA WAS ESSENTIALLY IN AGREEMENT WITH EFFORTS TO FOSTER NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AND IT HAD APPARENTLY WORKED OUT ACCORD WITH TANZANIA AND MOZAMBIQUE. NIGERIA AND GHANA, WHILE RECOGNIZING MPLA, HAD NOT RULED OUT NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. SCHAUFLELE SAID US PLANNED TO CONTINUE DIALOGUE WITH THOSE STATES. PROBLEM NOW WAS THAT MPLA REFUSES TO NEGOTIATE. SIMPLE APPEAL TO NEGOTIATION BY OAU WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH; SOME OAU MECHANISM WAS REQUIRED WHICH COULD FORCE SITUATION.

3. SCHAUFLELE TOLD SECK US WOULD CONTINUE TO RESIST SOVIET THRUST. IN SPITE OF SENATE ACTION, US HAD RESOURCES AND WAS RESOLVED TO PLAY ROLE WE FOUND NECESSARY TO PROMOTE NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE US HAD NO SPECIAL INTERESTS IN ANGOLA, WE ARE WORLD POWER

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 001469 TOSEC 250190

AND HAVE GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH WE MUST TAKE SERIOUSLY. WE HAVE BEEN WORKING WITH SOVIETS IN SPIRIT OF DETENTE IN EFFORT TO DETERMINE RULES OF GAME. IN 1972 US AND USSR SIGNED ACCORD UNDER WHICH WE AGREED NOT TO EXPLOIT SITUATIONS FOR UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. ACTIONS OF SOVIET UNION IN ANGOLA WERE NOT IN KEEPING WITH THIS ACCORD. IN SITUATIONS SUCH AS THESE WHERE SOVIET UNION TRIES TO CHANGE EXISTING EQUILIBRIUM, US COULD NOT REST INDIFFERENT.

4. FORNMIN SECK SAID GOS HAD FOLLOWED SCHAUFEELE VISIT CAREFULLY AND HAD GIVEN IT CONSIDERABLE MEDIA COVERAGE. ANGOLAN PROBLEM WAS ONE WHERE US AND GOS HAD VERY SIMILAR POSITIONS AND WERE JOINED IN INTEREST OF PEACEFUL SOLUTION. SENEGAL'S VIEW, SECK SAID, WAS THAT IT COULD NOT ADMIT FOREIGN INTERVENTION. IF AFRICA COULD NOT HANDLE SITUA-  
ION, UN SHOULD SEIZE PROBLEM AND ASSURE FREE CHOICE FOR ANGOLANS. SECK AGREED WITH SCHAUFEELE THAT ANRVLA WAS MOST SERIOUS AFRICAN PROBLEM SINCE CONGO CRISIS AND WITH IT FUTURE OF OAU WAS AT STAKE. HE FELT ADDIS MEETING WOULD BE DIFFICULT BUT HOPED THAT GRAVITY OF ANGOLAN QUESTION MIGHT BRING WISDOM TO OAU COUNCILS, AND LEAD REPRESENTATIVES TO REDUCE PREACHING AND REACH CONSENSUS. IT WAS CLEAR THAT AFRICA HAD NO REAL FORCE IN FACE OF GREAT POWERS. THIS WAS ANOTHER REASON, SECK FELT, WHY OAU SHOULD NOT BE ESTROYED.

5. GOS HAD SEEN ZAMBIAN PROPOSAL AND SECK FELT SENEGALESE WOULD SUPPORT IT IF IT WERE ADVANCED OPENLY AT ADDIS. SECK BELIEVED NIGERIA SUPPORTED MPLA AS MUCH FOR DOMESTIC AS FOR INTERNATIONAL REASONS. NEW LAGOS REGIME WAS HEAVILY WEIGHTED WITH NORTHERN CONSERVATIVES WHO FELT NEED TO STRIKE PROGRESSIVE IMAGE. SECK EXPECTED VERBAL OFFENSIVE FROM NIGERIA, WHICH WOULD GIVE AID AND COMFORT TO AFRICA'S TRADITIONAL EXTREMISTS, ALGERIA AND GUINEA. HOWEVER, SENEGAL KNEW PRECISELY WHAT IT WANTED AND NO ONE WOULD WREST ITS POSITION AWAY. EITHER OAU WOULD REACH COMPROMISE ON ANGOLAN QUESTION, OR ORGANIZATION WOULD BE FACED WITH MAJOR INTERNAL CONFRONTATION. SENEGAL HOPED LIKE-MINDED AFRICAN STATES WOULD FIGHT AS HARD AS SENEGAL IS PREPARED TO FIGHT.  
AGGREY

UNQUOTE INGERSOLL

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** TOSEC, INTERVENTION, POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, CAT-B, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 04 JAN 1976  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** buchant0  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1976STATE001469  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** O:PKJOHNSON  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** N760001-0073  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 2  
**Legacy Key:** link1976/newtext/t19760188/aaaaczwo.tel  
**Line Count:** 145  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ORIGIN NODS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** NODIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** NODIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** buchant0  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 23 JUN 2004  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <23 JUN 2004 by izenbei0>; APPROVED <04 OCT 2004 by buchant0>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
04 MAY 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** LOCK1  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SECK ON ANGOLA  
**TAGS:** PFOR, AO, SG, US, UR, SF, (SECK, ASSANE)  
**To:** SECRETARY  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006